This chapter contains sections titled: Stich's Epistemology A Brief Digression: The Role of Intuitions in Epistemology A Critique: The Pragmatic Virtues of Reliabilism Conclusion References.

Rudolf Carnap and W. V. Quine, two of the twentieth century's most important philosophers, corresponded at length—and over a long period of time—on matters personal, professional, and philosophical. Their friendship encompassed issues and disagreements that go to the heart of contemporary philosophic discussions. Carnap (1891-1970) was a founder and leader of the logical positivist school. The younger Quine (1908-) began as his staunch admirer but diverged from him increasingly over questions in the analysis of meaning and the (...) justification of belief. That they remained close, relishing their differences through years of correspondence, shows their stature both as thinkers and as friends. The letters are presented here, in full, for the first time. The substantial introduction by Richard Creath offers a lively overview of Carnap's and Quine's careers and backgrounds, allowing the nonspecialist to see their writings in historical and intellectual perspective. Creath also provides a judicious analysis of the philosophical divide between them, showing how deep the issues cut into the discipline, and how to a large extent they remain unresolved. (shrink)

Quintessence for the first time collects Quine's classic essays (such as "Two Dogmas" and "On What There Is") in one volume—and thus offers readers a much ...

"Some Pow'r did us the giftie grant/ To see oursels as others can't." With that play on Burns' famous line as a preface, Willard Van Orman Quine sets out to spin the yarn of his life so far. And it is a gift indeed to see one of the world's most famous philosophers as no one else has seen him before. To catch an intimate glimpse of his seminal and controversial theories of philosophy, logic, and language as they evolved, (...) and to hear his warm and often amusing comments on famous contemporary philosophers.From his beginnings in Akron, Ohio in the early 1900s, Quine takes us on a tour of over 100 countries over three-quarters of a century, including close observations of the Depression and two world wars. Far from a philosophical tract, it is an ebullient, folksy account of a richly varied and rounded life. When he does dip into philosophy, it is generally of the armchair sort, and laced with a gentle good humor: "There is that which one wants to do for the glory of having done it, and there is that which one wants to do for the joy of doing it. One can want to be a scientist because he wants to see himself as a Darwin or an Einstein, and one can want to be a scientist because he is curious about what makes things tick.... In normal cases the two kinds of motivation are in time brought to terms.... In me the glory motive lingered......In this book, Quine approaches the details of his life the way he has always approached them with a sharp sense of interest, adventure and fun. And he has a skill for picking a word that is just off-center enough to pull an ordinary event out of the humdrum of daily life and evoke its personal meaning. The result is a book of memories that is utterly mesmerizing.Willard Van Orman Quine is the author of numerous books, including Word and Object, published by The MIT Press in 1960.A Bradford Book. (shrink)

This is an extensively revised edition of Mr. Quine's introduction to abstract set theory and to various axiomatic systematizations of the subject. The treatment of ordinal numbers has been strengthened and much simplified, especially in the theory of transfinite recursions, by adding an axiom and reworking the proofs. Infinite cardinals are treated anew in clearer and fuller terms than before. Improvements have been made all through the book; in various instances a proof has been shortened, a theorem strengthened, a (...) space-saving lemma inserted, an obscurity clarified, an error corrected, a historical omission supplied, or a new event noted. (shrink)

These essays, along with several manuscripts published here for the first time, offer a more complete and highly defined picture than ever before of one of the ...

1 Meaning and Truth Objection to propositions Propositions as information Diffuseness of empirical meaning Propositions dismissed Truth and semantic ascent Tokens and eternal sentences 2 Grammar Grammar by recursion Categories Immanence and transcendence Grammarian's goal reexamined Logical grammar Redundant devices Names and functors Lexicon, particle, and name Criterion of lexicon Time, events, adverbs Attitudes and modality 3 Truth Truth and satisfaction Satisfaction by sequences Tarski's definition of truth Paradox in the object language Resolution in set theory 4 Logical Truth (...) In terms of structure In terms of substitution In terms of models Adequacy of substituteon In terms of proof In terms of grammar 5 The Scope of Logic Affinities of identity Identity reduced Set theory Set theory in sheep's clothing Logic in wolf's clothing Scope of the virtual theory Simulated class quantification Other simulated quantification Annexes 6 Deviant Login Change of logic, change of subject Logic in translation Law of excluded middle Debate about the dichotomy Intuitionism Branched quantifiers Substitutional quantification Its strength 7 The Ground of Logical Truth The semblance of a theory An untenable dualism The place of logic For Further Reading Index. (shrink)

In Exodus 2, Moses has two mothers; his Hebrew mother, who nurses him and the daughter of Pharaoh, who financially supports his Hebrew mother, adopts him, and names him. Pharaoh’s daughter appears in scholarly discussions, yet little attention is given to her role as mother of Moses. Indeed, this motherhood is downplayed in the biblical texts, and also in biblical scholarship, wherein the daughter of Pharaoh is absent from many discussions of biblical mothers and is at times relegated beneath the (...) birthmother in commentaries. This article argues that we should remember and celebrate the daughter of Pharaoh as a mother of Moses. (shrink)

In this, the Henriette Hertz Philosophical Lecture for 1965, Geach adopts a shotgun technique to save Time from the reductionists, both physicalistic and idealistic. The victims of the blasts are variously Quine, Smart, and McTaggart; Russell does not escape unscathed either. At the back of Geach's seeming arbitrary dismissal of various forms and consequences of the reduction of Time lurks an ontology of substance fortified by what Geach envisages as the successful development of a logic of (...) temporal concepts based on modal logic. The key to this ontology emerges at crucial points as the basic inviolability of first-person knowledge and discourse: e.g., "we do know that our plans and purposes radically alter our physical environment, and there's an end on't; any contrary [deterministic] theory, however plausibly argued, just has to be false".—E. A. R. (shrink)

A letter to The Times of London, May 9, 1992 protesting the Cambridge University proposal to award an honorary degree to M. Jacques Derrida.

The contemporary physical description of the universe reflects the inanimate world only. Broadening this description by including life may limit the application of well?established physical laws and may find new forces of the universe governing living organizations. This may also require adoption of some new assumptions and methodological principles, such as a broader principle of uncertainty, and recognition of the fact that humans? ability to manifest biofield communication is distributed very unevenly in the population. Based on available body of scientific (...) literature it is suggested that at this time, before the theoretical basis of the biofield is developed, it is important to conduct a broad experimental study of highly psi?gifted individuals in order to accumulate scientific knowledge of humans? ability to interact with matter, i.e., known physical fields and living organisms by intent. One can expect that current studies of organisms? genomes and attempts to utilize stem cells in medicine will call for the recognition of the biofield and its operative control function in organisms. However, developing a from?the?top?down view on the organism by the suggested approach will shorten this process and it deserves appropriate investment of social resources. (shrink)

This chapter explores some of the relations between Quine’s and Carnap’s metaontological stances on the one hand, and contemporary work in the metaphysics of time, on the other. Contemporary metaphysics of time, like analytic metaphysics in general, grew out of the revival of the discipline that Quine’s critique of the logical empiricists (such as Carnap) made possible. At the same time, the metaphysics of time has, in some respects, strayed far from its Quinean roots. (...) This chapter examines some likely Quinean and Carnapian reactions to elements of the contemporary scene. (shrink)

IN THE beginning Parmenides sought to deny the void. But he found himself trapped by his language and his thought into admitting what he sought to deny. Wisely, he counseled others to avoid the whole region in which the problem arises, lest they too be unwarily ensnared. Plato, being less easily intimidated and grasping for the first time the urgency of the paradox, unearthed each snare in turn until he felt he had found a safe path through the forbidden (...) terrain in a new conception of being and the derivation of its linguistic consequences in the Sophist. Aristotle evidently took Parmenides’ advice; and save for a few groping scholastics, perhaps Leibniz, Brentano, and Meinong, and Frege only in passing, no one else attempted the crossing before Russell made his spectacular dash through the posted ground from the completely new direction of linguistic reference. Again the problem lay dormant for half a century until Strawson constructed a new low road through ordinary language and Quine improved Russell’s high algebraic pass. Refinements of these routes have been forthcoming, especially from Searle and Kripke, until today it might appear that there are two super highways through Parmenides’ forbidden country of nonbeing. In this essay I will first argue that these new linguistic highways are no more than flimsy camouflage hiding but not resolving the old paradoxes. I will then show how Plato’s ontological way out, though more difficult, is the straight and narrow path. (shrink)

Revisionary ontologists are making a comeback. Quasi-nihilists, like Peter van Inwagen and Trenton Merricks, insist that the only composite objects that exist are living things. Unrestriced universalists, like W.V.O. Quine, David Lewis, Mark Heller, and Hud Hudson, insist that any collection of objects composes something, no matter how scattered over time and space they may be. And there are more besides. The result, says Eli Hirsch, is that many commonsense judgments about the existence or identity of highly visible (...) physical objects are a priori necessarily false. In a “last ditch effort” to bring revisionary ontologists back to their senses, Hirsch marshalls what he calls the Argument from Charity. We can be sure that there are tables and chairs and that there are no fusions of Plato’s nose and the Eiffel Tower, says Hirsch, because these commonsense platitudes are a logical consequence of the well-known principle of interpretive charity applied to natural languages, like English. In what follows, I assess the Argument from Charity. My conclusion is that if this is the best we can do to save revisionary ontologists, they are surely lost forever. (shrink)

In order to reconnect Quine's views to the current debate on scientific realism, I reframe Quine's scientific realism into a semantic, a metaphysical, and an epistemological dimension. With this conceptual background, I review the historical development of Quine's scientific realism from the late 1940s until his death in 2000. I challenge Soames's view that Quine is a phenomenalist at the time of “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951) and show that he remains agnostic between a realist (...) and an anti‐realist conceptual scheme instead. I also argue that Quine's early views on regimentation are incompatible with a strong formulation of semantic realism. I proceed in reconstructing how he becomes a metaphysical and epistemological realist in the mid‐1950s and argue against the view of Keskinen and Fogelin that interprets Quine as being a metaphysical anti‐realist. Contrary to Davidson, I defend the view that he never gave up normative epistemology and really is a proper epistemological realist. Finally, I discuss how he tries to reconcile his realism with his thesis of ontological relativity and how this necessitates the switch to a stronger form of semantic realism. (shrink)

Quine is routinely perceived as saving metaphysics from Carnapian positivism. Where Carnap rejects metaphysical existence claims as meaningless, Quine is taken to restore their intelligibility by dismantling the former’s internal–external distinction. The problem with this picture, however, is that it does not sit well with the fact that Quine, on many occasions, has argued that metaphysical existence claims ought to be dismissed. Setting aside the hypothesis that Quine’s metaphysical position is incoherent, one has to conclude that (...) his views on metaphysics are subtler than is often presupposed; both the received view that Quine saved metaphysics and the opposite view that Carnap and Quine are on the same anti-metaphysical team seem too one-sided if we take seriously Quine’s own pronouncements on the issue. In this paper, I offer a detailed reconstruction of Quine’s perspective on metaphysical existence claims. Scrutinizing his published work as well as unpublished papers, letters, and notebooks, I show how Quine is able to both blur the boundary between scientific sense and metaphysical nonsense and to argue that we cannot ask what reality is really like in a distinctively philosophical way. I argue that although Quine’s position is much closer to Carnap’s than the received view suggests, it still differs in two crucial respects. (shrink)

Quine correctly argues that Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions rests on a distinction between analytic and synthetic, which Quine rejects. I argue that Quine needs something like Carnap's distinction to enable him to explain the obviousness of elementary mathematics, while at the same time continuing to maintain as he does that the ultimate ground for holding mathematics to be a body of truths lies in the contribution that mathematics makes to our overall scientific theory (...) of the world. Quine's arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction, even if fully accepted, still leave room for a notion of pragmatic analyticity sufficient for the indicated purpose. (shrink)

Relative essentialism, the view that multiple objects about which there are distinct de re modal truths can occupy the same space at the same time, is a metaphysical view that dissolves a number of metaphysical issues. The present essay constructs and defends relative essentialism and argues that it is implicit in some of the ideas of W. V. Quine and Donald Davidson. Davidson’s published views about individuation and sameness can accommodate the common-sense insights about change and persistence of (...) Aristotle and Kripke. Aristotle and Kripke have to give up unmediated direct reference resting on a unique correct articulation of reality into entities. Davidson has to acknowledge a distinction between descriptions giving accidental and those giving essential features of an object. Quine and Davidson were in a position to be a relative essentialist, but were over-impressed by supervenience. The relative essentialist view of beings developed from Quine and Davidson strongly suggests the Heideggerian distinction between beings and Being, and is the perspective from which analytic philosophy can engage that topic. Relative essentialism also connects analytic philosophy to Derrida’s thinking about differance. (shrink)

Abstract At the time of The Logical Syntax of Language (Syntax), Quine was, in his own words, a disciple of Carnap’s who read this work page by page as it issued from Ina Carnap’s typewriter. The present paper will show that there were serious problems with how Syntax dealt with ontological claims. These problems were especially pronounced when Carnap attempted to deal with higher order quantification. Carnap, at the time, viewed all talk of reference as being part (...) of the misleading material mode of speech, and as such dismissed, rather than addressed, ontological problems. Central to the analysis in the present paper is the concept of an explication, which was seen by both Carnap and Quine as being of great philosophical importance. It will be shown that the concept of explication played a significant role in how each formulated their mature position on ontology. Both these final positions on ontology can also be seen as a evolving in reaction to Carnap’s flawed handling of ontological matters at the time of Syntax. Carnap, influenced by Tarski’s work on semantics, comes to believe that the concept of reference can be given an acceptable explication, and that by doing so we can see reference to abstract objects as unobjectionable. As a result, Carnap develops a position very different from the one presented in Syntax. Quine strongly rejected the instrumentalism of Syntax, and sought to give an explication of ontological questions that was language independent. This paper closes with a discussion of each’s understanding of the other’s position. (shrink)

W.V. Quine is one of the leading figures of 20th century analytic philosophy, and still among the most influential. But his work can be challenging and complex, and indeed often misunderstood. In this updated introduction to Quine's thought, Gary Kemp examines his seemingly disparate views as a unified whole and offers a valuable guide for anyone approaching Quine for the first time.

This brief text assists students in understanding Quine's philosophy and thinking so that they can more fully engage in useful, intelligent class dialogue and improve their understanding of course content. Part of the "Wadsworth Philosophers Series," (which will eventually consist of approximately 100 titles, each focusing on a single "thinker" from ancient times to the present), ON QUINE is written by a philosopher deeply versed in the philosophy of this key thinker. Like other books in the series, this (...) concise book offers sufficient insight into the thinking of a notable philosopher better enabling students to engage the reading and to discuss the material in class and on paper. (shrink)

Gary Ebbs: Quine's Naturalistic Explication of Carnap's Logic of Science: If one studies Quine's epistemology without appreciating its deep connections to Carnap's logic of science, one can easily get the impression that unlike Carnap, Quine aims to preserve and clarify the traditional empiricist idea that our best theories of nature are justified by, or based on, our sensory evidence, and are for that reason likely to be true. Quine writes, for instance, that [The] human subject is (...) accorded a certain experimentally controlled input—certain patterns of irradiation in assorted frequencies, for instance—and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as output a description of the three‐dimensional external world and its history. The relation between the meager input and the torrential output is a relation that we are prompted to study for somewhat the same reasons that always prompted epistemology; namely, in order to see how evidence relates to theory, and in what ways one's theory of nature transcends any available evidence. Commenting on this and similar passages in Quine, Barry Stroud writes: … the question Quine poses in terms of the “underdetermination” of the “torrential output” by the “meager input” makes essential use of a notion of epistemic priority. It is because the “information” we get at “input” does not uniquely determine the truth of what we assert as “output” that we must explain how we get from the one to the other. I argue that despite its superficial plausibility, this interpretation of Quine is mistaken: following Carnap, yet also radically transforming his views, Quine takes our best current theory as our ultimate arbiter of truth. The goal of Quine's naturalistic account of the relationship between theory and evidence is not to show that our best theories of nature are justified by our sensory evidence, but to show that we can describe science from within science itself in a way that mirrors and thereby clarifies his doctrinal principle that we can only judge truth from the standpoint of our best current theory. (shrink)

Thanks largely to Daniel Dennett, I am a recent convert to what many will regard as the shocking hypothesis that qualia do not exist. This admission is not quite a confident sighting of that rarest of philosophical birds, an unequivocally sound and valid argument. For one thing, I have, like many, been frustrated by and suspicious of philosophers' use of qualia for some time, and have often wished them dead ; so I was an easy mark. More to the (...) point, I was persuaded by Dennett without being persuaded by his arguments. This is not intended as a confession of a Kirkegaardian penchant for preferring to believe the conclusions of bad arguments. Dennett enabled me finally to kick qualia out of my private ontology by providing, in the later sections of his “Quining Qualia”, an alternative conceptual vocabulary for talking about the contents of perceptual and reflective experience that genuinely makes no appeal, surreptitious or otherwise, to qualia. Furthermore, Dennett's most general motivations for banishing qualia—the convictions that there is no compelling evidence for them, that they serve no reliable explanatory purpose and that the hypothesis of their non-existence dissolves some otherwise wrenching philosophical dilemmas—are the right ones, and his paper made this clear to me. However, I feel the need to quine qualia again for myself, because I want them to stay dead, and am afraid that, due to some infelicities in his argument, Dennett has only wounded them. (shrink)

The most influential philosopher in the analytic tradition of his time, Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000) changed the way we think about language and its relation to the world. His rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, his scepticism about modal logic and essentialism, his celebrated theme of the indeterminacy of translation, and his advocacy of naturalism have challenged key assumptions of the prevailing orthodoxy and helped shape the development of much of recent philosophy. This introduction to Quine's philosophical (...) ideas provides philosophers, students and generalists with an authoritative analysis of his lasting contributions to philosophy. Quine's ideas throughout are contrasted with more traditional views, as well as with contemporaries such as Frege, Russell, Carnap, Davidson, Field, Kripke and Chomsky, enabling the reader to grasp a clear sense of the place of Quine's views in twentieth-century philosophy and the important criticisms of them. (shrink)

W.V.O. Quine and A.N. Whitehead shared a dualistic ontology of concrete and abstract objects but differed sharply on the status of properties. In this essay, we explore Whitehead’s reasons for admitting properties into his ontology and Quine’s objections. In the course of examining Quine’s position we demonstrate some deficiencies in his position and conclude that in spite of his claims, neither space-time coordinate systems nor classes can do all the ontological work of properties.

This article is mainly concerned to summarise a fairly well articulated position on the philosophy of science which may be extracted from scattered passages in quine's "word and object." (1) there is no sharp line between philosophy and science, Or between science and mathematics, Or between science and common sense. (2) abstract mathematical entities are theoretical posits just as electrons are. (3) epistemology is a branch of biology. (4) quine's earlier instrumentalism has given way to a scientific realism. (...) (5) quine's philosophy of space-Time is briefly discussed. (6) an extensional language is adequate for science. (shrink)

Our daily experience, dominated by the corporate clock that so many of us contort ourselves to fit inside, is destroying us. It wasn't built for people, it was built for profit. This is a book that tears open the seams of reality as we know it-the way we experience time itself-and rearranges it, reimagining a world not centered around work, the office clock, or the profit motive. Explaining how we got to the point where time became money, Odell (...) offers us new models to live by--inspired by pre-industrial cultures, ecological, and geological time--that make a more humane, more hopeful way of living seem possible. In this dazzling, subversive, and deeply hopeful reframing of time, Jenny Odell takes us on a journey through other temporal habitats. As planet-bound animals, we live inside shortening and lengthening days, alongside gardens growing, birds migrating, and cliffs eroding. The stretchy quality of waiting and desire, the way the present may suddenly feel marbled with childhood memory, the slow but sure procession of a pregnancy, or the time it takes to heal from injuries--physical or emotional. Odell urges us to become stewards of these different rhythms of life, to imagine a life, identity, and source of meaning outside of the world of work and profit, and to understand that the trajectory of our lives--or the life of the planet--is not a foregone conclusion. In that sense, "saving" time-recovering its fundamentally irreducible and inventive nature-could also mean that time saves us. (shrink)

Although Łukasiewicz and Quine do not share many common views, they agreed on one important point in the 1950s: they both denied the distinction between empirical and a priori sciences. This agreement might be surprising as this denial was rather controversial at that time. This paper focuses on Quine’s and Łukasiewicz’s denials of the distinction between empirical and a priori sciences, and proposes three possible answers to the question of why both formulated the same conclusion at a (...) similar time. Firstly, it discusses Quine’s possible influence on Łukasiewicz as Łukasiewicz agreed with Quine’s criticism of modality at that time. Secondly, it considers the possibility that Quine was affected by Łukasiewicz via his debates with Łukasiewicz’s student, Tarski. Lastly, it takes into account the possibility that both philosophers were inspired by an external source, namely the rise of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

in april 1933, two bright young Ph.D.s were elected to the Harvard Society of Fellows: the psychologist B. F. Skinner and the philosopher/logician W. V. Quine. Both men would become among the most influential scholars of their time; Skinner leads the "Top 100 Most Eminent Psychologists of the 20th Century," whereas philosophers have selected Quine as the most important Anglophone philosopher after the Second World War.1 At the height of their fame, Skinner and Quine became "Edgar (...) Pierce twins"; the latter obtaining the endowed chair at Harvard's department of philosophy, the former taking up the position at Harvard's psychology department.2Besides these biographical parallels, there also... (shrink)

- Quine's 1946 lecture Nominalism is a superb exposition of his early views on ontological commitment. In my opinion, they are presented more clearly in this lecture than in On What There Is. I go on to illustrate these views in connection with the problem of finding nominalistically acceptable paraphrases of two sentences: ‘Some zoological species are cross-fertile' and ‘There are three times as many dogs as there are cats'. Various philosophical problems are examined that arise from the paraphrases (...) taken into consideration. I conclude that the value of the lecture does not lie in its contribution to the "nominalist paraphrase project", but rather in what it adds to our understanding of how ontological disputes should be conducted. (shrink)

W.V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein have been compared with regard to the analytic/synthetic distinction, propositions known a priori or a posteriori, mathematical and logical necessity and naturalism, amongst other topics. Following Pieranna Garavaso and Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, I compare how Quine and Wittgenstein conceptualize a system of beliefs. Overlooked is Wittgenstein's description of the role of propositions and Quine's description of the location of propositions. The difference between the role and location signals a difference in how these frameworks (...) conceptualize the boundary between empirical and logical propositions, and in particular the justificatory status of propositions in the system. The Wittgensteinian framework accommodates a change in the justificatory status of propositions: propositions can play at one time a rule-like role and at another time an empirical role. For Quine, change in status refers to revising the proposition (or not) in the light of recalcitrant evidence. (shrink)

Since I wrote my doctoral dissertation lo! these forty-seven years ago under Professor Quine, my colleague Alain Voizard thought it fitting that I comment on the paper just delivered. The invitation flattered me, I confess, as did Professor Quine's choice of a subject: free logic, a logic of which I was one of the numerous fathers thirty-five years ago. So, it is in my capacity as a commentator that I address you now, saving for tomorrow afternoon further thoughts (...) prompted by this colloquium. (shrink)

Hilary Putnam’s views on analyticity, synonymy, and meaning-change loom large in his writing on logic, mathematics, and science. In “The analytic and the synthetic” (Scientific explanation, space, and time, Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp. 358–397, 1962), Putnam argues that (i) Quine is wrong in claiming that there just is no analytic-synthetic distinction, but (ii) Quine is right in arguing that analyticity plays no significant role in the philosophy or science (...) (except, perhaps, linguistics). In some interesting ways, Putnam’s views on these matters connect with those developed in Friedrich Waismann’s “Analytic-synthetic”, published serially in Analysis (Analysis 10:25–40, [1949], Analysis 11:25–38, [1950], Analysis 11:49–61, [1951a], Analysis 11:115–124, [1951b], Analysis 13:1–4, [1952], Analysis 13:73–89, [1953]), around the same period as Quine’s “Two dogmas of empiricism” (Philosophical Review 60:20–43, 1951). Waismann provides a rich and subtle conception of analyticity and meaning, and the role that analyticity and synonymy play in linguistic interpretation (see also Waismann in Proceedings of theAristotelian Society, Supplementary 19:119–150, [1945]). (shrink)

W. van Orman Quine is one of the leading philosophers in America today. His thinking, however, has received little attention from philosophers in continental Europe. This book is a systematic and critical account of Quine's philosophy which aims at isolating what is of lasting value in his work. Each of his major theses is submitted to a thorough examination both from within and from without his general standpoint. Quine's positions have changed a great deal over the years (...) in response to external criticism and to internal stresses and strains. These changes are described and assessed. Quine's rejection of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy is considered in the light of non-monotonic logic. The multi-farious versions of his holism are brought together and evaluated. Dummett's objection to the effect that holism is inconsistent with empiricism is refuted. lt is argued, however, that the controversial thesis of the indeterminacy of translation becomes implausible as soon as learnability constraints are brought to bear on the matter. Quine's new definition of logical truth in terms of grammatical structure is vindicated. It is shown how the apparent conflict between his earlier and his later views on ontology can be superseded. Can Quine hold a relativist view of ontology and at the same time maintain a non-relativist theory of truth? Can he hold that truth is internal to theories and claim that scientific theories are underdetermined by observational data without lending support to relativism? An affirmative answer to the first question is defended. It is argued, however, that Quine could not meet the second challenge. Quine's penetrating criticism of modal logic has prompted several research programs. Paul Gochet exhibits the interrelations between these programs and argues that Quine's objections against modal logic can be met without any commitment to doctrines such as essentialism. Of interest to: Philosophers, logicians, linguists. (shrink)

This unique study brings together for the first time two of the most important philosophers of this century. Never before have these two thinkers been compared - and commentators' opinions on their relationship differ greatly. Are the views of Wittgenstein and Quine on method and the nature of philosophy comparable or radically opposed? Does Wittgenstein's concept of language engender that of Quine, or threaten its philosophical foundations? An understanding of the similarities and differences between the thought of (...) Wittgenstein and of Quine is essential if we are to have a full picture of contemporary philosophy. This collection of essays offers diverse and original ways in which to view their relationship. (shrink)

The most influential philosopher in the analytic tradition of his time, Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000) changed the way we think about language and its relation to the world. His rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, his scepticism about modal logic and essentialism, his celebrated theme of the indeterminacy of translation, and his advocacy of naturalism have challenged key assumptions of the prevailing orthodoxy and helped shape the development of much of recent philosophy.This introduction to Quine's philosophical ideas (...) provides philosophers, students, and generalists with an authoritative analysis of Quine's lasting contributions to philosophy. The major themes covered include the adaptation of the language of modern logic to formulate a criterion of ontological commitment; Quine's own ontological commitments; Duhemian-Holistic empiricism and the attendant rejection of a priori knowledge; the nature and grounds of logical truth; Quine's criticisms of such notions as meaning, synonymy, analyticity, and necessity; the conjecture of the indeterminacy of translation; modal logic; propositional attitudes; and Quine's work on naturalized epistemology.Quine's ideas throughout are contrasted with more traditional views, as well as with contemporaries such as Frege, Russell, Carnap, Davidson, Field, Kripke, and Chomsky, enabling the reader to grasp a clear sense of the place of Quine's views in twentieth-century philosophy and the important criticisms of them. (shrink)

What is W. V. O. Quine’s relationship to classical pragmatism? Although he resists the comparison to William James in particular, commentators have seen an affinity between his “web of belief” model of theory confirmation and James’s claim that our beliefs form a “stock” that faces new experience as a corporate body. I argue that the similarity is only superficial. James thinks our web of beliefs should be responsive not just to perceptual but also to emotional experiences in some cases; (...) Quine denies this. I motivate James’s controversial view by appealing to an episode in the history of medicine when a researcher self-experimented by swallowing a vial of bacteria that at the time had not been studied in much detail. The researcher’s commitment to his own as-yet untested hypothesis was based in part on emotional considerations. Finally, I argue that Quine’s insistence that emotions can never be relevant to adjusting our web of belief reflects a tacit holdover of one of logical positivism’s crucially anti-pragmatist commitments—that philosophy of science should focus exclusively on the context of justification, not the context of discovery. James’s emphasis on discovery as a (perhaps the) crucial locus for epistemological inquiry is characteristic of pragmatism in general. Since Quinean epistemology is always an epistemology of justification, he is not happily viewed as a member of the pragmatist tradition. (shrink)

A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY examines the nature of philosophical enterprise and philosophy's role in Western culture. Jones and Fogelin weave key passages from classic philosophy works into their comments and criticisms, giving A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY the combined advantages of a source book and textbook. The text concentrates on major figures in each historical period, combining exposition with direct quotations from the philosophers themselves. The text places philosophers in appropriate cultural context and shows how their theories reflect the (...) concerns of their times. (shrink)

In the middle of the twentieth century a dispute erupted between the chief architect of Logical Empiricism, Rudolf Carnap, and Logical Empiricism’s chief reformer, Willard van Orman Quine -- who was attempting to save what he took to be its main insights by recasting them in a more acceptable form. Though both eschewed metaphysics of the traditional apriori sort, and both were intent on making the investigation of science the center of philosophy, they disagreed about how to do (...) so. Part of the disagreement involved the nature of ontological disputes. The central documents in the debate are: (i) Quine’s 1948 article, “On What There Is,” which tells us how to discern ontological.. (shrink)

Scientific journals ask authors to put their manuscripts, at the submission stage, sometimes in a complex style and a specific pagination format that are time consuming while it is unclear yet that the submitted manuscripts will be accepted. In the case of rejections, authors need to submit to another journal most likely with a different style and formatting that require additional work and time. To save authors’ time, publishers should allow authors to submit their manuscripts in (...) any format and to comply with the style required by the targeted journal only in revised versions, but not at the submission step when the manuscripts are not yet approved for publication. (shrink)

Rudolf Carnap and W. V. O Quine have long been seen as key figures of analytic philosophy who are opposed to each other, due in no small part to their famed debate over the analytic/synthetic distinction. This volume of new essays assembles for the first time a number of scholars of the history of analytic philosophy who see Carnap and Quine as figures largely sympathetic to each other in their philosophical views. The essays acknowledge the differences which (...) exist, but through their emphasis on Carnap and Quine's shared assumption about how philosophy should be done-that philosophy should be complementary to and continuous with the natural and mathematical sciences-our understanding of how they diverge is also deepened. This volume reshapes our understanding not only of Carnap and Quine, but of the history of analytic philosophy generally. (shrink)